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joe trapido
KINSHASA’S 
THEATRE OF POWER
Metropolitan Disorders—11
Kinshasa is a natural amphitheatre.
1 The older, more afflu-
ent districts of the city sit on a flat ‘stage’ of grey alluvial 
sand and clay next to the Congo River. Post-colonial sub-
urbs, slums for the most part, have grown up on the red, 
erosion-prone soil of the ‘stands’, the ring of hills surrounding this 
plain. From a vantage point in downtown Kinshasa, with one’s back to 
the river, the arena appears to be one-sided, but you can see both sides 
from the hills on a clear day. Across the water stands Brazzaville, capital 
of the Republic of Congo. These are the closest capital cities in the world, 
bisected only by the great river, and located at the point of a natural gate 
between the Congo basin and the Atlantic Ocean.2 Below Kinshasa, the 
Congo descends via a series of rapids, only becoming navigable again at 
Matadi, 600 km away. 
A recurring theme in the city’s history has been the failure to draw large 
portions of the Congo basin into its orbit. At several points—especially 
during the early 1960s, and after the fall of Mobutu’s regime in 1997—
the state based in Kinshasa has had very limited control over much of 
the country, constituting just one pole among many for the evacuation 
of commodities to the global economy. The eastern Congolese regions 
became the fiefdoms of unruly barons, often theoretically command-
ers in the national army, who played a complex game, juggling between 
the various power centres. Yet however feeble its grip on the hinterland 
might be, Kinshasa has always retained its position as first among equals. 
Whoever manages to rule in the capital will be recognized as sovereign. 
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And sovereignty grants its holder significant resources: aid and loans; 
rents from industrial enclaves (however feeble); a veto over who multi-
national capital can treat with; the power to issue passports and visas; 
votes to hawk at the un—all of which tip the scales for Kinshasa over its 
rivals. The corollary of this is that ‘national politics’ has typically meant, 
first and foremost, controlling the capital city. This is reflected in, and 
driven by, an extraordinary creative narcissism that pervades the city.3 
Most ‘national’ politicians have, deep down, been something smaller 
and more splendid—adept players on the intimate city-stage, patrons 
of footballers and musicians, handing out largesse to supplicants from 
the windows of their cars and romancing scandalous beauties; sitting in 
open-air bars, drinking cold beer and eating slices of catfish steamed in 
stock and chilli, while paying scant attention to wider conditions.
Beyond the world of formal politics, identities forged by music, religion 
or networks of informal economic activity have often preserved and 
reconfigured ideas of exchange and solidarity, allowing the Kinois to 
maintain a little order at the edge of the void.4 Examples of this solidarity 
can be found everywhere in a city that has been more peaceful and better 
fed than its dire economic situation would lead one to expect. For much 
of the 2000s, levels of severe malnutrition in the city were compara-
tively low, in spite of major disruptions to the food supply. hiv was first 
identified in Kinshasa, but infection rates are lower than in surrounding 
1 This image is drawn from Léon De Saint Moulin, Villes et organisation de l’espace 
au Congo (rdc), Tervuren 2010, p. 244. The author would like to thank Saint Jose 
Inaka Bokulaka, Ian Phimister, and Carlos Sardiña.
2 Congo-Brazzaville was colonized by the French; its much larger neighbour, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, was a Belgian territory during the age of empire. 
Although there has always been interchange between the two banks of the river, the 
colonial and post-colonial periods have given them very different histories, adding 
to the psychological distance between the cities. Once the more peaceful and better 
functioning of the pair, Brazzaville has been cursed in recent times by abundant 
off-shore energy reserves, finding itself sucked into the vortex of Big Oil. While con-
flict in the drc tends to spare Kinshasa, Brazzaville usually bears the brunt of any 
fighting. Several recent elections have ended in gun battles on the capital’s streets 
between youth gangs representing the major factions: Remy Bazernguissa-Ganga, 
‘Les “guerres électorales” et les mobilisations violentes au Congo-Brazzaville’, in 
Kadya Tall et al., eds, Collective Mobilisations in Africa, Leiden 2015.
3 Filip De Boeck and Marie Plissart, Kinshasa: Tales of the Invisible City, Tervuren 
2004, pp. 53–4.
4 Theodore Trefon, ed., Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State 
Failure in Kinshasa, London 2004.
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countries (and much lower than in southern Africa). The city’s relatively 
cohesive social fabric may have contributed to this, along with the Kinois’ 
grown-up attitude to pleasure: the wild stories about condoms and aids 
that one encounters in South Africa are entirely absent here. Private gun 
possession is rare; insecurity has grown in recent years, but you can still 
walk home after dark safely in much of the city, and street-level money-
changers sit calmly with thousands of dollars in plain sight.5 In what 
follows, I will track the origins and development of Kinshasa from the 
pre-colonial period to its current position as one of Africa’s mega-cities, 
a centre of political resistance and a vibrant cultural hub, whose inhabit-
ants have a vital role to play in the Congo’s uncertain future. 
Origins and growth
Kinshasa’s earliest settlers came for the fish and the fertile soil. The 
growth of the world economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
prompted an upsurge of economic activity throughout central Africa, 
and the area where the city now stands became a huge market: the name 
of its chief pre-colonial inhabitants, the Bateke, derives from the verb 
‘to sell’. At some points during this era, the proto-city is thought to have 
housed as many as 30,000 people.6 By the late nineteenth century, car-
goes of rubber, ivory and slaves were regularly unloaded by boatmen 
from upriver. Then as now, other poles of attraction drew trade away 
from Kinshasa: Swahili-speaking Muslim slave traders, drawing finance 
from as far afield as Gujarat and moving goods east towards the Indian 
Ocean, had established outposts covering more than half of the area 
that would become the modern drc.7 High prices for ivory and rubber 
on the world market subsidized the internal transport of slaves, while 
the dynamics of war and trade increased the demand for dependants to 
work, marry or be sacrificed within the ritual economy.
5 This social solidarity has a dark side: the low crime rates owe something to the fate 
reserved for petty thieves by ordinary Kinois—if caught, they face severe or even 
fatal beatings.
6 Moulin, Villes et organisation de l’espace au Congo, p. 217; Charles Didier Gondola, 
Villes miroirs: Migrations et identités urbaines à Kinshasa et Brazzaville, 1930–1970, 
Paris 1996, p. 31.
7 William Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in 
the Nineteenth Century, London 1989; Robert Harms, ‘The World Abir Made: The 
Margina-Lopori Basin, 1885–1903’, African Economic History, no. 12, 1983; François 
Renault, Tippo Tip: Un potentat arabe en Afrique centrale au xixe siècle, Paris 1987.
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The first European settlement in the area was established by Henry 
Morton Stanley in 1881, as part of his great mission to lay claim to the 
Congo on behalf of the Belgian king, Léopold ii. Stanley left the embry-
onic Léopoldville in the hands of his young disciple Anthony Swinburne. 
In 1884, Swinburne had to confront the Italian explorer Savorgnan de 
Brazza, acting in the name of France; Brazza was forced to confine his 
ambitions to the opposite bank of the river, and a vital bridgehead for 
Léopold’s colonization project was preserved.8 Belgian officials soon 
took control of the growing town as the Congo Free State was inaugu-
rated. A railway link between Léopoldville and the port at Matadi was 
completed in 1898, at a huge cost in human lives, removing the need for 
goods to be carried overland past the rapids downstream. 
While the political geography of Kinshasa is still shaped by pre-colonial 
imperatives, its demographics mark a profound rupture with that world. 
Very soon after European settlement began, the former inhabitants of 
the area, the Teke and the Humbu, were displaced by other groups. This 
was accompanied by a catastrophic general fall in population throughout 
central Africa in the late Victorian period: sleeping sickness may have 
reduced the population of the lower Congo by as much as 85 per cent 
between 1899 and 1907.9 In the early days of the colonial city, African 
newcomers tended to come from the Kikongo-speaking lower Congo—
the area between Kinshasa and the sea—or from the forested regions 
upriver. Many of the latter were recruits to the force publique, Belgium’s 
colonial army, where a kind of Bobangi pidgin was employed as the lin-
gua franca. This language, dubbed Lingala, became the city’s argot. This 
may help explain why the politics of identity, though still important, 
appear to be a good deal weaker in modern-day Kinshasa than in many 
African cities. Inter-ethnic marriage is the norm; hardly anyone claims 
the city as their unique ancestral terrain; and the Kinois are rarely able to 
speak the languages of their forebears. A slangy, French-strewn Lingala 
is the badge of metropolitan sophistication. 
The Belgian state assumed control of Léopold’s private colony shortly 
before the First World War, coinciding with a gradual shift away from 
8 David van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic History of a People, London 2013, pp. 49–52.
9 Isidore Ndaywel é Nziem, Histoire générale du Congo: de l’héritage ancien à la 
République Démocratique, Paris 1998, p. 343.
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the murderously exploitative ‘red rubber’ period towards a more orderly 
system of profiteering based on the Congo’s vast mineral wealth. 
Léopoldville had a dual function in the colonial economy. While it was 
chiefly a hub for the export of primary products to the outside world, 
with the railways and steam boats a major source of employment for 
the city’s inhabitants, manufacturing for the domestic market also got 
off the ground, and textiles and brewing became important industries. 
William Lever’s Huileries du Congo Belge (hcb) combined both aspects: 
the company’s vast palm-oil plantations—larger than Belgium itself, 
and notorious for their brutality—shipped their harvest via Léopoldville, 
where it would be prepared for export; hcb factories also produced soap 
for local consumption. However, the Congo’s most valuable commodity, 
copper produced in the south-eastern province of Katanga, was diverted 
away from Kinshasa, going south instead: first through British territo-
ries in southern Africa, later via the Benguela railway to Angola. This 
established a development pattern whereby the Congo’s great cash cow 
was semi-detached from the rest of the colony, and semi-attached to the 
British mining complex with its heart in South Africa’s Rand, contribut-
ing greatly to the secessionist tendencies of the modern state.10 
In 1926, Léopoldville supplanted Boma as capital of the Belgian Congo. 
During the inter-war period, the city’s population doubled to reach 
50,000; by 1959, it would have 300,000 inhabitants, including 25,000 
European settlers.11 This rate of expansion was not held in check by 
apartheid-style controls on free movement in rural districts, intended to 
prop up regimes of forced labour: periodic sweeps in the capital would 
root out those without permits to stay, but more always came to take their 
places.12 The colonial city became the centre of a thriving musical culture, 
influenced by styles imported from across the Atlantic. It also witnessed 
the first political stirrings among the Congo’s African population, as 
10 Gondola, Villes miroirs, pp. 66–7. The Congo’s territory is so vast that the capital 
of Katanga, now called Lubumbashi, is geographically equidistant between Pretoria 
and Kinshasa. 
11 Van Reybrouck, Congo, pp. 164, 249.
12 The restrictions on internal migration in the Belgian Congo were among the 
most stringent ever seen. Messianic religions that emerged during the inter-
war period would hand out pass documents for access to heaven, indicating the 
degree of control—both physical and psychological—exerted on a once largely 
nomadic population.
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a challenge to colonial rule gathered momentum in the post-war dec-
ades. Having long rejected calls for greater autonomy, Brussels suddenly 
changed direction at the beginning of 1959, after riots had broken out as 
crowds emerged from a football match in Léopoldville’s King Badouin 
Stadium, spiralling into disorder that was repressed by the Belgian 
army at the cost of several hundred Congolese lives. There would be 
no end to outside interference, however: as the Congo moved towards 
independence, Belgium and the us worked tirelessly to undermine the 
government of Patrice Lumumba, whose overthrow plunged the new 
state into civil war.13
Opposition capital 
Mobutu Sese Seko came to power in a 1965 coup amidst the chaos of 
the immediate post-colonial years, offering the Congolese street a res-
pite from the antics of ‘politicians’ and ‘intellectuals’, who were, it was 
said, driving the country into the ground. Léopoldville was rechristened 
Kinshasa in 1966; the Congo itself became Zaire five years later. Mobutu’s 
bid for popular approval was partly based on his credentials as a supporter 
of the Kinshasa football team Vita Club—whose rioting supporters had 
hastened the arrival of independence six years earlier—and of the big 
band ok Jazz. Both were popular with the ‘bills’, young Kinois men from 
poor neighbourhoods who loved cowboy films: they dressed in check 
shirts, rode bicycle ‘horses’ (sometimes with lassos), fought with their 
bare hands and devised an extravagant alternative vocabulary known 
as hindou-bill.14 Music had become a central part of the city’s identity, 
embedded in webs of patronage and solidarity, honour and obligation. 
The lyrics of the time were studded with the names of Kinshasa’s elite: 
Patrice Lumumba was recorded in song, as were the rivals who would 
destroy him, along with powerful women traders, lovers, businessmen, 
bar owners and furniture salesmen. The name that appeared most 
frequently, of course, was that of Mobutu himself. Music, dance and 
dress were the most prominent expressions of authenticité, the ersatz-
traditional cult of personality nurtured by the regime. The capital’s new 
ruling class were the sponsors of these cultural performances; the art 
of praising the powerful for money went from strength to strength. 
13 Joe Trapido, ‘Africa’s Leaky Giant’, nlr 92, March–April 2015.
14 De Boeck and Plissart, Kinshasa, pp. 36–40.
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This rediscovery of the praise-singing tradition went hand in hand with 
Zairianization: the redistribution of medium-sized foreign-owned assets 
to regime insiders, dressed up in the rhetoric of popular nationalism. 
During the latter stages of Mobutu’s long reign, Kinshasa became the 
centre of opposition to his regime—a stance it would retain under the rule 
of Laurent and Joseph Kabila. Up until the mid 1970s, almost everything 
had gone Mobutu’s way, to the point that all possible bases of dissent—
rebellions in the interior, radical students, scheming barons—appeared 
to have been swept away. But then Mobutu’s winning streak came to an 
end, as a cluster of setbacks destroyed his aura of competence: these ills 
were both economic (plummeting copper prices, inflation, a steep fall 
in gdp) and political (a farcical military adventure in Angola, followed 
by an invasion of Katanga by exiled rebels that was only repelled with 
foreign assistance).15 In the early years of the dictatorship, the manu-
facturing base which Kinshasa inherited from the colonial regime had 
been preserved and even expanded to some extent: Goodyear, Renault, 
British Leyland and General Motors all set up factories in the city during 
the 1960s. This trend went into reverse as the foreign loans lavished 
on Mobutu’s regime suddenly dried up, Zairianization wrought havoc 
with the local economy, and the collapse of agricultural production in 
the Congolese interior dealt a heavy blow to Kinshasa’s role as an inter-
mediary for the world market. Transport links began to disintegrate: 
eventually there would no longer even be a road linking the Congo’s 
main city to Kikwit, capital of the neighbouring province.
In 1977, Mobutu announced that the latest of the regime’s five-year 
‘mandates’ would allow contested elections for the position of ‘people’s 
commissars’.16 This was an innovation that the dictator regretted and 
reversed as soon as he could, but by then the die was cast. Although 
all of the commissars had come from the Mobutist stable, they now 
possessed real mandates and began to ask troublesome questions. The 
15 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian 
State, London 1985, pp. 376–90; Ndaywel, Histoire générale du Congo, pp. 714–49.
16  These absurd plebiscitary rituals played an important part in the Mobutist political 
theatre. Luambo Makiadi, the great musician and courtier of the regime, released 
a campaign single in 1982 with the title Candidat na Biso Mobutu (‘Our candidate 
Mobutu’). The record’s B-side simply reproduced its A-side: the subtlest of digs at 
the integrity of the exercise, from an otherwise keen supporter of the regime.
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most determined among them later founded the udps (Union pour la 
Démocratie et Progrès Social) under the leadership of Etienne Tshisekedi, 
who had been one of Mobutu’s favourite young technocrats in the 1960s. 
While other leaders were tempted away with bribes and threats, Tshisekedi 
remained unbroken, and his house in the central Limete district became 
a symbol of resistance. Kinshasa was the focus of this political energy: in 
contrast to the country’s second-largest city, Lubumbashi, the opposition 
there was not fractured along ethnic lines.17
The failure of the Kinshasa-based opposition can be partly credited to 
Mobutu’s skill in manipulating his opponents, many of whom were 
plain opportunists; equally important was the reluctance of Western 
leaders to offer any assistance to leaders who, like Tshisekedi, were 
answerable to a popular constituency. It also owed much to the intel-
lectual biases of the opposition leadership, who were drawn from social 
groups that had initially welcomed Mobutu: lawyers, clergymen and ex-
Mobutist deputies. They saw their huge popular support as a source of 
legitimacy, but not as a way to seize power.18 By the end of the 1980s, 
none of the regime’s leaders dared to appear on the streets of Kinshasa 
without an armed guard. But the opposition leadership kept on channel-
ling popular discontent into a pseudo-legalistic framework. When the 
dictator was forced to negotiate with them, Tshisekedi and his allies were 
asked to form a government on several occasions, only to be turfed out a 
few months later. As long as Mobutu controlled the government coffers 
and its machinery of repression, he would not allow anything that struck 
at his fundamental interests. When mass looting broke out in 1991, a 
huge crowd of the bana tshangu—some of Kinshasa’s poorest and most 
truculent inhabitants, from the vast slums of Masina and Kimbanseke—
17 Mobutu may have been reluctant to play on ethnic divisions in the capital, knowing 
that ‘his’ people, the Bangala—a privileged but deeply resented minority—would 
most likely have borne the brunt of any communal violence. While the dictator 
repeatedly provoked such conflagrations in other parts of the country, he pulled 
back from the brink in Kinshasa itself.
18 The remnants of the more radical movements that had supported the uprisings of 
the 1960s looked on from across the river in Brazzaville, but only Antoine Gizenga 
and his Partie d’Action Lumumbiste (palu) managed to build any sort of popular 
base within the country—and as other Kinois who tried to join palu discovered, 
the party was really an ethnic fief for Gizenga’s own Pende group, with a support 
base fixated on the magical powers of its ageing leader.
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arrived at Tshisekedi’s house in Limete, imploring him to march with 
them to the primature and seize power. Tshisekedi simply told them 
to go home.19 
By the time Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan allies swept away the old 
regime in 1997, Tshisekedi’s absorption by the Kinois hall of mirrors 
was absolute. He allowed himself to be reappointed as prime minister 
by Mobutu just a month before the dictator fled his country for good. 
With Kabila already established in Kisangani, Tshisekedi tried to offer 
him important positions in a government of national unity. Mobutu 
showed his displeasure by dismissing Tshisekedi after less than a week 
in office; Kabila, in a strong position, saw no reason to bargain with 
his old enemies. Once in power, he derided Kinshasa’s civil opposition 
as collaborators. This was self-serving nonsense, but there could be lit-
tle doubt that the temporizing of the opposition chiefs had led them to 
squander a historic opportunity, opening the gates to the warlords from 
the east. The Kinois were spared the worst horrors of the conflict that 
followed Mobutu’s ouster, its ravages largely concentrated in the east. In 
the post-war elections of 2006 and 2011, the capital voted heavily against 
Laurent Kabila’s son and heir Joseph: raised in Tanzania, with a shaky 
grasp of French and hardly any Lingala, Kabila fils was widely detested by 
the city’s inhabitants as a foreign carpetbagger.20
Dancing on the edge
The progressive contraction of the economy from the mid 1970s until 
the early 2000s, which culminated in hyper-inflation and the disappear-
ance of the banking system, made familiar capitalist understandings 
of wealth, time and even personhood secondary. This did not drive the 
Kinois towards an imaginative autarky: indeed, the idea of reaching 
Europe became an obsession for the young and the ruling class alike. 
But this dream was ultimately focused on a glorious return to Kinshasa. 
The allure of the mega-city as ritual centre was expressed most forcefully 
in the culture of the young, who did everything they could to get out, but 
19 The riots of the early 90s finished off what was left of Kinshasa’s industrial base, 
as the gm plant in Masina was burnt to the ground.
20 A groundless rumour that Joseph Kabila is not really his father’s son but a 
Rwandan Tutsi called Hyppolite Kanambe remains popular to this day.
66 nlr 98
also made huge sacrifices in order to return in splendour and perform a 
kind of potlatch on the city stage, dispensing cash and goods with wild 
abandon and even engaging in theatrical destruction of property. The 
bana lunda, youths who went to mine diamonds in Angola’s Lunda Norte 
province, struggled in the most appalling and dangerous conditions, then 
returned to Kinshasa to spend their gains in weeks of riotous living.21 
Another group of young Kinois, the mikiliste—those who had gone to 
mikili (Europe)—took big risks with cheque and credit-card fraud, only 
to splurge the proceeds back home in the most spectacular fashion.
From the late 70s on, young Kinois men—and sometimes women—
were characterized by two obsessions: designer clothes and music. 
Their sartorial obsessions playfully echoed the dapper, suit-wearing 
functionary who had represented a social ideal for the previous genera-
tion, before the collapse of the formal economy had rendered concepts 
of time-discipline and saving meaningless.22 Evading easy categoriza-
tion under the sign of resistance or consumerism, the sapeur appears 
to shimmer with meanings beyond the ken of a Western observer, with 
his clear-glass Cartier frames, Gaultier kilt, and Hermès umbrella to be 
opened indoors. Designer clothes stolen in Europe became a kind of 
social currency. Sometimes clothes were even sent as remittances, to be 
traded at half the retail price in a system of exchange that relied upon the 
extraordinary degree of connoisseurship among ordinary Kinois: street 
children could tell you the going rate for a pair of Versace trousers.
The heroin trafficker and style icon Adrien Mombele—more commonly 
known as Stervos Niarcos, after a Greek shipping magnate—became an 
emblem for the generation that came of age in the 1970s. The son of 
Pierre Mombele, a Bateke noble who was part of Mobutu’s inner cir-
cle, Niarcos was not himself the product of material hardship. But his 
iconic status owed everything to the conjuncture. After two generations 
of economic growth, the young found their prospects to be vastly worse 
21 Filip De Boeck, ‘Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Identity, Expenditure 
and Sharing in Southwestern Zaire (1984–1997)’, Development and Change, 
vol. 29, no. 4, 1998.
22 The sapeur phenomenon first began across the river in Brazzaville; the classic 
sociological treatments of its origins are Justin Gandoulou’s two volumes Dandies à 
Bacongo: le culte de l’élégance dans la société congolaise contemporaine, Paris 1989, and 
Au cœur de la sape: mœurs et aventures des congolais à Paris, Paris 1989.
trapido: Kinshasa 67
than those faced by their parents. For Kinois with the requisite nerve, 
crime offered an escape route from the economic wasteland bequeathed 
by their elders. Graduating from dope smoking with the toughs in his 
neighbourhood, Niarcos made connections with underworld figures 
across the river in Brazzaville, where he took part in robberies and dis-
covered the cult of designer clothing.
Back in Kinshasa, the main hang-out for Niarcos and his pals was the 
‘Village Molokai’, a compound in the entertainment district of Matongé 
that belonged to the musician Papa Wemba. Niarcos became a star 
through mentions in pop songs that he paid for with clothes stolen 
from Europe. Cash gradually came to predominate as the currency of 
choice for songwriters. As record sales collapsed in the 1990s, younger 
members of the political elite, cheque-fraud superstars based in Paris or 
London, and émigré diamond dealers all started to invest in this system 
of prestige, transforming pop records into a kind of social almanac. The 
economic foundations on which music and dandyism floated have long 
since crumbled: crackdowns in Europe have shifted the centre of grav-
ity for Congolese fraudsters towards East Asia, or towards Africa’s own 
burgeoning financial sector. There is now a yawning gap between small-
scale crookery and the predations of the elite, and the names of diaspora 
Congolese have largely ceased to feature in popular song, leaving only 
the luminaries of the political class to shine.
Flight to the city
The Mobutu years saw the population of the capital increase dramatically. 
Current estimates lie somewhere between seven and nine million, and 
Kinshasa is expected to reach sixteen million by 2025, surpassing Lagos 
and Cairo as the largest city in Africa. Much of this growth, especially 
since the 1990s, has been endogenous: the city has a high birth rate, and 
the Congolese population as a whole has been rising steadily across the 
same period, from 20 million at independence to an estimated 67 mil-
lion today. But Kinshasa, like other Congolese cities, has grown at a rate 
well above the national average, thanks largely to an exodus from the 
countryside. Richer Kinois often claim that rural migrants have come to 
the city for frivolous reasons. It is true that some politicians made wild 
promises to rural electorates about jobs in the capital during the early 
years of independence. It is also true that Kinshasa holds a formidable 
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mystique for the rest of the country. The city’s powerful culture industry 
has drawn many under its spell: rural youngsters can be heard express-
ing themselves in the cadences of slang Lingala. Other factors are far 
more important, however. As recent health surveys have shown, on 
almost every indicator—access to health care, nutrition, education—
Kinshasa’s urban dwellers are better off than their rural counterparts.23 
Economic implosions in the hinterland, such as the collapse of planta-
tion agriculture and, more recently, a fall in the price of diamonds, have 
spurred the flight from the countryside.24 
Violence has also been a crucial stimulus. Controls on internal migra-
tion fell apart after independence, and successive waves of conflict in the 
immediate post-colonial years drove many to flee to Kinshasa. In more 
recent times, unpaid soldiers began to roam the countryside unchecked, 
and economic activity consolidated around mafia-like networks.25 These 
trends culminated in the 1997–2006 war, accelerating the exodus from 
rural Congo—although it was the urban centres of the east that attracted 
the greatest number of war refugees. A more routine kind of violence 
continues to drive people towards the capital today. Women have often 
borne the brunt of this everyday brutality. The health survey cited above 
revealed very high levels of sexual violence throughout the country, 
with the lowest rates in Kinshasa and Bas-Congo. While the scale of the 
problem is generally attributed to the war, the highest levels of reported 
sexual violence were actually to be found in Kasai-Occidental, a prov-
ince that was relatively peaceful for most of the 1990s and 2000s. In 
general, women in rural areas were much worse off than those who 
lived in cities.26 
Gender-based oppression has long been a stimulus to migration: 
during the colonial years, state-appointed chiefs—wealthy men in 
otherwise impoverished areas—paid bride-price on all the available 
women in a district. Women performed much of the agricultural labour, 
23 Deuxième Enquête Démographique et de Santé, eds-rdc ii 2013–14; Jason Stearns, 
‘What socio-economic data tells us about sexual violence, découpage and living con-
ditions in the Congo’, Congo Siasa Blog, 27 March 2015. 
24 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, pp. 309–23.
25 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, London 1998; Timothy 
Raeymaekers, ‘Protection for Sale? War and the Transformation of Regulation on 
the Congo-Ugandan Border’, Development and Change, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010.
26 eds-rdc ii 2013–14, pp. 311–3.
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and could also be ‘lent’ to poorer men, or resold at monopoly prices. 
Despite the best efforts of the colonial authorities, women fled these 
miniature despots for the city in large numbers, often finding them-
selves without legal means of support in the new urban environment. 
Transient, remunerative relations with men became a career choice; 
the most successful took many lovers, formed savings clubs that met 
in bars, and became icons of fashion and popular music. This gen-
erated a moral panic on both sides of the racial divide, giving rise to 
legislation that banned multiple wives and imposed taxes on ‘theoreti-
cally single women’ in urban areas. Marriage was defined in opposition 
to the public sexuality associated with spaces like the bar and the street: 
the ndumba, a kind of prostitute or courtesan who existed outside the 
lineage-based economy of bride-wealth, stood in contrast to the mwasi ya 
libala, the woman of marriage.27 
A caste of high-status courtesans remains a notable feature of modern 
Kinshasa. This category includes many women who operate in the 
public domain: journalists, bar owners, musicians and members of 
high-profile savings clubs. There is a scandalous prestige accompanying 
such figures, and the energetic pursuit of the courtesan vote has been 
one of the more amiable features of recent electoral contests. But the 
freedom of Kinois women is still restricted by social convention, and 
the contrast between the ‘daughter of the home’ (mwana palais) and 
the ‘daughter of the street’ (mwana libanda) continues to govern female 
behaviour. Women who carry out their business in public are liable to be 
classified as ndumba by default. 
Growing pains
The city’s growth has put enormous strain on its built environment. 
Urban planning by the state effectively came to a halt after the Belgians 
left. Kinshasa’s planning authority did produce a series of blueprints in 
the period following independence, with help from the Mission Française 
d’Urbanisme (mfu), a French government body. These blueprints 
assumed higher levels of car ownership than were realistic, and did not 
27 Nancy Rose Hunt, ‘Noise over Camouflaged Polygamy, Colonial Morality Taxation, 
and a Woman-Naming Crisis in Belgian Africa’, The Journal of African History, 
vol. 32, no. 3, 1991; Tshalika Biaya, ‘La Culture urbaine dans les arts populaires 
d’Afrique: analyse de l’ambiance zaïroise’, Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 
vol. 30, no. 3, 1996.
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anticipate the actual rate of population growth. While the mfu steered 
through some French-built tower blocks in downtown Kinshasa, adding 
to Zaire’s debt burden, little else of what was promised in the plans ever 
materialized, and the French finally packed up and left in 1977.28 A few 
other countries, notably Maoist China, have left their mark on the city, 
chiefly in the form of monuments. But for the most part, Kinshasa’s 
growth since 1960 has been the chaotic, unplanned work of its inhabit-
ants. The age of settlements can easily be gauged by the height of the 
mango and avocado trees that were planted by the first pioneers.29 
Economic segregation is looser than in many conurbations of the global 
South. Although Kinshasa’s central districts tend to be far more affluent 
than its periphery, there are significant numbers of poor people living 
in almost every part of the city. The wealthiest neighbourhoods are to 
be found in Gombe, Bon Marché, Mbinza and Limete, while the great-
est concentration of poverty is in east Kinshasa; Tshangu, an area that 
includes the communes of Ndjili, Kimbanseke and Masina, contains 
some of the world’s biggest slums. Right across the social spectrum, 
Kinois districts usually possess a strong collective identity: people 
will talk of themselves as bana quartier (literally, ‘children of a quar-
ter’). Denizens of Gombe are snobs who always want to speak French 
and refer to their area as ‘La Gombe’; their counterparts in Bandal 
and Lemba argue furiously about which district should be known as 
Kinshasa’s Paris (Bandal for its fashion and nightlife; Lemba, with its 
university, for the intellectuals). Pop groups rely heavily on the support 
of certain areas when building a fan base.30 Tshangu has the strongest 
identity of all. During moments of political strife, its entrance can be 
barricaded, and the descents of the bana tshangu on the city centre carry 
a strong insurrectionary charge. 
The neighbourhoods created during the early post-independence 
years were eventually recognized by the authorities and provided with 
water and electricity supplies. Ambitious politicians offered patronage 
28 Luce Beeckmans, ‘French Planning in a Former Belgian Colony: A Critical 
Analysis of the French Urban Planning Missions in Post-Independence Kinshasa’, 
oase Journal for Architecture 82, 2010.
29 Moulin, Villes et organisation, p. 244.
30 Oddly enough, the same does not hold true for football clubs: allegiance is strictly 
random throughout the city.
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and protection to certain areas, easing their passage to formal status. 
There was more to be gained through the city’s expansion than populist 
legitimacy, of course: generations of politicians and bureaucrats made 
a killing from bribery and speculation as the public lands encircling 
Kinshasa were settled. By the 1980s, the state’s role in providing services 
had atrophied. Road building and maintenance ground to a halt; the tacit 
convention that new settlements would eventually be hooked up to the 
municipal grid was abandoned. Kinshasa’s main source of electricity, 
the vast hydroelectric power station at Inga, became severely dilapidated, 
operating well below full capacity. Sub-stations in the city itself fell into 
disrepair, and greater demand was placed on a diminishing supply as 
new districts hot-wired cables to existing power sources. 
In Kinshasa today, officials try to manage the crumbling power network 
with localized black-outs, which residents in turn try to circumvent with 
yet more improvised cables, resulting in a chaotic tangle of unmapped 
secondary circuitry. Evening strolls in the city are often illuminated by 
these cables—known colloquially as machopo ya courrant (electricity 
intestines)—glowing red in the unlit streets. Alarming enough at the 
best of times, this poses a particular hazard during rainy season, when 
pools of rainwater can be electrified: the singer Celeo gave voice to the 
fears of many Kinois with his refrain Mwana asubela courrant (‘the kid 
peed on the electricity current’). Even relatively privileged areas of the 
city can go without power for months at a time, and wood or charcoal 
are typically used for energy-intensive tasks like cooking, with predict-
ably dire consequences in terms of air pollution and deforestation of the 
hinterland. The incongruity of this situation, in a country with some of 
the world’s most powerful hydroelectric dams, is not lost on the Kinois. 
The water supply has also become markedly unreliable, especially on 
higher ground, where people leave the tap on overnight with a bucket 
underneath, hoping for a trickle.
It would be wrong to paint a picture of unmitigated decline in Kinshasa’s 
infrastructure, as the last fifteen years have witnessed a lopsided growth 
of sorts. The road network has begun to recover, having reached a point in 
the early 2000s where surfaces had disappeared entirely in many areas.31  
31 When it rained, the main route to the university entailed dismounting from a 
combi-taxi, paying street children a small fee to carry one across a thigh-deep pud-
dle, then boarding a new taxi on the other side.
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Roads are still extremely poor in residential neighbourhoods, but the 
main arteries have been transformed with the help of concessional loans 
from the Chinese. A limited municipal bus service has been inaugu-
rated, covering busy routes on the new roads at rush hour. Mobile-phone 
networks have expanded dramatically, resulting in a boost for govern-
ment revenues, but also creating job opportunities for many ordinary 
Kinois as sellers of phone credit. 
Remaking Kinshasa
The most profitable area of urban development, however, has been 
housing, something which has proved to be much less of a boon for 
the average citizen.32 From the 1980s on, property prices rose as reg-
ulation was progressively undermined. This trend began in central 
neighbourhoods where legal restrictions on the size of deposits were 
surreptitiously negotiated away, along with a ban on the dollarization 
of rental agreements. In the early 90s, rents and house prices lurched 
upwards in many parts of Kinshasa: this may have been caused by the 
return of successful emigrants from Europe and bana lunda, diamond 
miners who had made their money in Angola, paying for houses in 
cash. There was also a bubble stemming from pyramid schemes set 
up by figures in the Mobutist elite: in the frenzy to participate, many 
middle-class Kinois sold their houses and became renters.33 By the time 
these schemes collapsed, the pool of renters had expanded substan-
tially. After a brief hiatus during the rule of Laurent Kabila, prices took 
off again. Old Mobutist cadres sold their homes in central Kinshasa to 
cronies of the new regime, or rented them out to the contingent of aid 
bureaucrats who arrived with the un.34 Small houses in downtown areas 
like Gombe now change hands for well over a million dollars, while 
32 The following analysis is largely based on conversations with informal estate 
agents in Kinshasa. 
33 Bogomil Jewsiewicki, ‘Jeux d’argent et de pouvoir au Zaïre: la “bindomanie” et 
le crépuscule de la deuxième république’, Politique Africaine, vol. 46, no. 55, 1992.
34 Foreigners are considered desirable tenants not only because of the high rents 
they can afford to pay, but also because they can be relied upon to actually cough up, 
unlike the local worthies who will invariably try to use their connections to renege 
on a deal. One acquaintance of mine had to park a clapped-out banger in front of a 
Jeep belonging to a well-paid political adviser who owed him thousands of dollars 
in back rent; he eventually received the Jeep itself in lieu of payment.
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apartments can be rented to foreigners for at least $5,000 a month. 
The property boom also produced a ripple effect, as sellers and renters 
‘downsized’ into neighbourhoods further out. To add fuel to the fire, 
Congolese elites received a cash bonanza from high mineral prices on 
the world market: with few other investment opportunities available in 
the local economy, property speculation became one of their preferred 
outlets, perhaps second only to capital flight.35 
This hike in prices, combined with the chaotic state of the cadastral reg-
ister, has inspired a series of violent conflicts over unbuilt areas of the 
city, in which alliances are struck between self-proclaimed customary 
chiefs, political factions, and foreign or expatriate capital.36 This is some-
times linked to the growth of exclusionary spaces—gated communities 
and shopping malls—which have lately begun to appear in Kinshasa, 
having been entirely absent before 2006. These projects look to Dubai 
or Guangzhou for inspiration as well as for finance. The Cité du Fleuve, 
a gated community of luxury dwellings, built in the otherwise impov-
erished neighbourhood of Kingabwa on land originally reclaimed from 
the river by rice farmers, is perhaps the most extreme example of such 
surreal late-capitalist flourishes.37 At Lemba Foire, a Chinese building 
consortium is now developing municipal land, much of which was for-
merly assigned to run-down but densely-populated tenement blocks. 
Drawing on the rhetoric of ‘urban regeneration’ so beloved of land 
profiteers everywhere, their new plans include provision for a thousand 
alleged ‘social housing’ units, priced at $217,000 each.38
35 In 2012, a dissident member of the ruling party alleged that Adolphe Muzito, then 
serving as prime minister, had managed to acquire at least 57 properties in prime 
Kinshasa locations: Alex Engwete, ‘Kleptocracy alley (redux)’, Alex Engwete Blog, 
12 March 2012. Contacts of mine who have collected property taxes in downtown 
Kinshasa—or at least attempted to do so—confirm the general picture of a ruling 
class whose members have put together big property portfolios. 
36 Inge Wagemakers and Oracle Makangu Diki, ‘Governance of Urban Agricultural 
Space in Kinshasa: Struggle for Land (drc)’, in An Ansoms and Stefaan Marysse, 
eds, Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods in the Great Lakes: A Political Economy 
Perspective, London 2011; Filip De Boeck, ‘Inhabiting Ocular Ground: Kinshasa’s 
Future in the Light of Congo’s Spectral Urban Politics’, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 
26, no. 2, May 2011. 
37 De Boeck, ‘Inhabiting Ocular Ground’.
38 Radio Okapi, ‘Kinshasa: des “logements sociaux” hors de prix à la Fikin’, 
Radiookapi.net, 8 October 2014.
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When capital is scarcer, elite factions set their sights on a less ambitious 
goal: to displace one set of poor people and replace them with others 
looking for somewhere to live. In one high-profile case, a group of rice 
farmers were locked in battle with a syndicate that was hoping to build 
slums on their land, and which counted government ministers and 
police officers among its members. The farmers, who were astute and 
rather lucky in their own alliances, appear to have won this battle—at 
least for the time being—after a series of terrifying confrontations with 
the police, during which they were shot at with bullets and tear gas: 
one farmer was killed, another imprisoned for over a year, with several 
more left permanently maimed. One of their leaders, a gentle, articulate 
woman in late middle age, had all her teeth knocked out with the butt of 
a policeman’s rifle.
The success of the rice farmers owed much to the fact that, most 
unusually, their representatives in the regional parliament and the 
national assembly—Gerard Mulumba (‘Gecoco’) and his brother Leon—
had championed their protests. Gecoco helped the farmers’ cause by 
manipulating factions within the government and publicizing their 
struggle in the media. He is generally held to be a minor crook, and 
has floated on the margins of Kinshasa’s theatre of power for almost 
two decades, adopting a typically flamboyant style. Yet his grounding 
in the community where he lives has gradually pushed Gecoco towards 
a more genuine populism: he has given away a substantial part of his 
income to build small bridges in the flood-prone Kingabwa constituency, 
and to cover the cost of funerals and hospital visits. Now that he has 
started to challenge elite interests on behalf of his constituents, Gecoco 
has become the focus of a minor personality cult among the inhabitants 
of Kingabwa. Such African populism is pathologized in the mainstream 
political science literature as a barrier to development. But whatever its 
faults, street-level politics of this kind, which tries to establish a more 
generous social contract between Kinshasa’s poor majority and the rul-
ing class, may be the best hope for progress in the years ahead. 
Patronage and praise
The obsession with performing upon the intimate stage of the city 
means that some of the resources that appear to have been siphoned 
away through corruption end up being spent in Kinshasa anyway. 
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During Mobutu’s reign, courtiers like Justin Bomboko, a cia favourite 
who made a fortune smuggling Zaire’s coffee exports across the border, 
spent much of the money on women and song in the capital.39 More 
recently, the same dynamics have been at work in the extraordinary 
growth of the city as a media hub. During the post-conflict transition, 
no fewer than forty free-to-air television stations were launched, nearly 
all with the backing of important figures from the ruling class. This 
has generated a lot of jobs for the children of the decayed middle class, 
although the wages rarely even cover the transport costs. The prolif-
eration of tv stations in one of the world’s least promising advertising 
markets cannot be separated from the tradition of praise-singing. Most 
journalists rely on payments from wealthy patrons to top up their negli-
gible salaries: such patrons can be the subject of a fawning interview, or 
a ‘news’ report on their triumphant progress through one of Kinshasa’s 
neighbourhoods.
Ordinary citizens frequently turn to les grands for protection. When 
Kinois have recourse to the law, for example—which they often do in this 
surprisingly litigious city—they have their money ready. Bribing a judge 
can be risky: pay too soon and he may get a better offer; too late and the 
matter is already settled. Better to have your grand let it be known that 
he is taking an interest. This contributes to a Lilliputian environment, 
where key members of the government and its security apparatus are 
constantly being asked to throw their weight behind the protagonists in 
bizarrely small-scale disputes. Control of high party and ministerial posi-
tions also grants one the right to sell jobs to the highest bidder, resulting 
in bitter intra-party struggles over seemingly trivial appointments: in 
2013, one palu cadre was killed in a dispute over the naming of a new 
permanent secretary.40 Lower down the food chain, every interaction 
with state officials is lubricated by unofficial fees and fines. Kinshasa’s 
main prison, Makala, swells during the day as an army of go-betweens 
take food and medicine to the prisoners in return for a payment to the 
otherwise penniless guards. $400 is enough to spring you from police 
detention for a wide variety of crimes. Civil-service jobs are now the 
only kind of formal-sector employment that retains much significance, 
39 Turner and Young, Rise and Decline, pp. 60–2.
40 ‘Incidents avec mort d’homme au siège du Palu: exclusions et poursuites judici-
aires annoncées’, Le Potentiel, 2 December 2013.
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but even here the official salaries are well below the cost of living, and 
arrears often stack up for months at a time: the main value of such posi-
tions lies in the opportunity they present for informal graft. 
These webs of solidarity and exchange, politics and criminality, can also 
be seen at work in the religious sphere. The Catholic and Protestant 
churches that dominated Kinshasa during the colonial period and 
for some time afterwards largely ignored the indigenous religious 
practices known as kindoki, leaving the field clear to local elders and 
neighbourhood ngangas to perform a variety of community services, 
such as consulting with ancestors, or prescribing charms that would 
ensure success in the pursuit of love, money and exam results. This 
division of labour broke down as a Pentecostal wave swept through 
Congolese cities from the 1990s, initially driven by American mission-
aries but quickly passing into the hands of local pastors. On the one 
hand, ngangas were denounced as agents of Satan in the Manichean 
theology of the Pentecostals. As social bonds fractured under the strain 
of economic hardship, the churches became a forum for the condemna-
tion of witchcraft, with old people and children especially vulnerable. On 
the other hand, aspects of the central African political tradition that had 
only exerted a subterranean influence since colonial times were unwit-
tingly brought back into public life by the Pentecostal movement.
Spirit possession and the channelling of blessings via gifted 
intermediaries—blessings which could include pregnancy, car owner-
ship or a trip to Europe—all now fell within the province of the Church. 
Prosperity being a sign of divine favour, God’s ambassadors came to be 
judged on their displays of wealth. Such metrics included the size of a 
pastor’s church, the quality of its air-conditioning system, and the opu-
lence of his clothing (carrying on the sapeur tradition). This imperative to 
serve God and Mammon naturally brought the Pentecostal churches into 
the realm of get-rich-quick schemes. Certain pastors became known for 
offering visas as well as blessings to help people on their way to Europe, 
most often secured through the pastor’s association with the docu-
ment-forging workshops which thrived before biometric data became 
standard. Along with relentless demands for mabonza (contributions) 
from their flocks, religious figures sought to raise funds in other ways. 
Tele-evangelists such as Frère Mukuna and Sony Kafuta (‘Rockman’) 
took to the airwaves, urging the faithful to vote for Kabila, as did the 
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spiritual leader of the Kimbanguist Church, who is believed by his fol-
lowers to be the (rather portly) embodiment of the Holy Spirit.41
Law and disorder
The descendants of the bills who supported Mobutu in the 60s are still 
very much a part of Kinois life, and keen as ever on music, martial arts 
and football.42 The fleeting alliances struck between these youths and 
les grands are an important aspect of the city’s political life, although 
they rarely translate into lasting pacts (as one popular song put it: ‘You 
are bringing us beer and stuff to eat? We’ll eat it with rice but we don’t 
choose you!’). The stadium of Vita Club remains a crucible of popular 
insurgency: policemen openly confess their terror at the prospect of 
local derby matches, where ultras will throw rocks at the players and 
remind the referee of where his house is. Riots provoked by defeats can 
rapidly assume a political character, and the chants which echo around 
the stands often convert the latest pop songs into barbs directed at the 
president. The club is now owned by General Amisi Kumba, former 
second-in-command of the drc’s army. Before his recall to Kinshasa, 
General Amisi was posted in the east, where he was accused of profiting 
from illegal mining.43 Investment in a team that commands the loyalty 
of so many Kinois seems like a shrewd move for a dissident baron whose 
political status is uncertain. 
In similar fashion, the leaders of popular fighting dojos are frequently 
recruited by political factions for their ability to mobilize (and perhaps 
41 Religion can also be a vehicle for popular dissent. ‘Archbishop’ Fernando Kutino, 
otherwise known for his designer outfits, took to the airwaves during the 2006 elec-
tion campaign with fire-and-brimstone anti-regime preaching. He was rewarded 
with a trumped-up charge of weapons possession and attempted murder, and was 
found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison, in spite of the collapse of the 
prosecution case.
42 Leon Tsambu-Bulu, ‘Musique et violence à Kinshasa’, in Theodore Trefon, ed., 
Ordre et désordre à Kinshasa: Réponses populaires à la faillite de l’État, Paris 2004; 
Katrien Pype, ‘Fighting Boys, Strong Men and Gorillas: Notes on the Imagination 
of Masculinities in Kinshasa’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 
vol. 77, no. 2; Kristien Geenen, ‘“Sleep Occupies No Space”: The Use of Public 
Space by Street Gangs in Kinshasa’, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, vol. 79, no. 3, 2009.
43 Thomas Fessy, ‘Congo General “Profits From Blood Gold”’, bbc News, 10 
November 2010.
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neutralize) sections of the popular classes. This complements the prac-
tice of paying people to show up at electoral rallies: five dollars is the 
going rate for attendance, with more for those offering some kind of 
protection or a show of force.44 One major political confrontation in 
the capital in 2010 pitted the television mogul and mp Puis Muabuilu 
against Deogratias Indulu; both men belonged to rival factions in Joseph 
Kabila’s pprd (Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie) 
movement. At a local party conference, this stand-off resulted in vio-
lent clashes between supporters of the two factions: Indulu carried the 
day with the help of ‘Chaleur’, a former African judo champion, and his 
young followers. In the national election that followed, Chaleur and his 
heavies brought crowds along to pprd rallies, while sabotaging opposi-
tion gatherings and burning the udps headquarters to the ground.45 The 
electoral logic of all this was obscure, as the antics of Chaleur and his 
followers often increased the hostility of Kinois to the regime. Chaleur 
and Indulu were themselves forced to flee under army protection when 
locals started to pelt a pro-Kabila rally in Matete with the contents of a 
nearby iron market (the locals later set off to ‘teach Chaleur a lesson’ in 
his home district of Ngaba, and were only driven back by gunfire).
The use of poor young men during the election campaign fed into a 
burgeoning panic about the koluna—a term which refers to machete-
wielding thugs said to be taking over Kinshasa, who are unsurprisingly 
linked in the popular imagination with the Kabila regime. Seeking 
to improve its image, Kabila’s government turned to punitive pop-
ulism in 2013 with Opération Likofi (‘operation uppercut’). Police death 
squads armed with shotguns were sent out in pick-up trucks at dusk 
to eliminate repeat offenders. As the operation gathered momentum, a 
hotline was set up allowing citizens to ‘shop a koluna’; a jazzy haircut or 
flipflops—supposedly telltale koluna signs, but really just the uniform 
of Kinois who are young, poor and male—could prove fatal. Human 
Rights Watch recorded at least 53 confirmed executions.46 Government 
44 One respected fixer told me that he arranges protection for events in return for 
a payment of $1,500: $500 for himself, $250 for his lieutenant, and $25 each for 
thirty men fuelled by beer, whiskey or dope.
45 Not that Tshisekedi’s followers were entirely pacific themselves: udps supporters 
had thrown petrol bombs at pprd buildings the previous day.
46 Human Rights Watch, Operation Likofi: Police Killings and Enforced Disappearances 
in Kinshasa, drc, New York 2014; Kristien Geenen, ‘Operation Likofi: Cleaning the 
Streets with a Punch’, African Studies Association conference presentation, 2014.
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ministers issued smirking denials that were purely intended for foreign 
consumption: nobody in Kinshasa was fooled.
Endgames
Tragedy and farce have never been clearly distinguished as dramatic 
modes on Kinshasa’s political stage. Joseph Kabila’s second term expires 
at the end of 2016, but there is little sign that he or his party will scurry 
off quietly. As the date of departure draws near, the attempts by Kabila’s 
entourage to cling on to power grow ever more farcical, but also seem 
reminiscent of Mobutu’s ragged and tragic playing for time. Kabila him-
self has rarely looked comfortable in Kinshasa. He has never mastered 
Lingala, its principal tongue; in a city where higher education is a kind 
of religion, with qualifications flaunted, he lacked a university degree for 
many years. He often appears queasy during public appearances, and 
spends much of his time at a ranch outside the city. In this most loqua-
cious of capitals, the most visible mark of Kabila’s personality comes not 
from his rare public pronouncements, but from his love of driving: he 
refuses to employ a chauffeur, driving himself in and out of the city at 
high speeds as part of the presidential cavalcade. 
While Kabila’s allies search for pretexts to delay the coming election, 
the security forces have cracked down on dissenters. In June 2015, 
police raided a meeting in Kinshasa organized by Filimbi, an umbrella 
movement of Congolese youth groups, and arrested the participants. 
Two were later charged with ‘conspiracy against the state’ and incite-
ment to revolt; if found guilty, they could face the death penalty. The 
regime seemed to be especially spooked by the presence of activists 
from Burkina Faso and Senegal at the meeting: in both countries, youth-
led popular mobilizations recently forced the departure of leaders who 
wanted to extend their time in office indefinitely. A new generation 
of Congolese student activists have been inspired by these examples 
and are willing to put themselves in harm’s way. The political opposi-
tion would no doubt be happy to make use of their bravery in order to 
oust Kabila and take power. But the most plausible candidate for the 
presidency, one-time Katanga governor Moise Katumbi, has been keen 
to offer assurances to power-brokers at home and abroad (not least the 
mining companies), and is unlikely to make any kind of serious break 
with the past if he replaces Kabila. 
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Many Kinois are hungry for change: for now, the street is more than 
happy to sing the constitutionalist songs promoted by activists, opposi-
tion politicians and the Catholic Church. When the drc’s football team 
returned victorious from a championship fi nal in February 2016, they 
were greeted at the airport by fans chanting ‘Kabila know it, your man-
date is over!’, subverting the regime’s bid to make propaganda hay from 
the event. But while the poor majority are not indifferent to the liberal 
demands of better-educated activists, something more robust would be 
needed to transform them into a reliable political force. The Burkinabé 
activists whose presence troubled the Congolese authorities so greatly 
owed much of their effectiveness to the memory of Thomas Sankara, 
and to the country’s more established Jacobin tradition: this meant that 
the popular classes had no trouble grasping the link between constitu-
tional questions and their own economic concerns. In the drc, on the 
other hand, no major politician views the economic populism of the 
poor as anything but a parlour game. For now, the theatre of elite distri-
bution that characterizes the culture of Kinshasa remains nothing more 
than an act.
